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I. INTRODUCTION 
The responsibility of the [Financial Policy] Committee in relation to 
the achievement of [the Bank of England’s financial stability] ob-
jective relates primarily to the identification of, monitoring of, and 
taking of action to remove or reduce, systemic risks with a view to 
protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system.1 
The concept of “resilience” in the context of financial systems calls 
for closer analysis, as most of the current efforts to reshape financial sys-
tems seek to render them more resilient. Resilience has become a neces-
sary complement to the paradigm shift taking place in global financial 
regulation toward “macroprudential” regulation—a term used to describe 
a new viewing platform and decisionmaking plane for financial regula-
tion. From this new perspective, regulators can address the state of the 
financial system as a whole, as well as its component parts. This, it is 
hoped, will better equip regulators to chart patterns of systemic risk and 
to counter such risk before it can materialize and imperil financial stabil-
ity.2 That is a big task. As such, it becomes all the more important to de-
velop, alongside macroprudential regulation, complementary efforts to 
engineer legal, economic, and even psychological solutions that increase 
self-reliance and resilience of individuals and communities in the face of 
financial losses. This resilience-building agenda has received much less 
attention and comment to date than the agenda concerned with systemic 
risk, despite resilience building being arguably more important given the 
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 1. Bank of England Act, 1998, c. 11, § 9C(2) (U.K.), as amended by Financial Services Act, 
2012, c. 21 (U.K.) (overhauling the regulation of the banking and financial services in the United 
Kingdom). 
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Crisis?, 3 LAW & FIN. MKTS. REV. 534 (2009); Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, Macropru-
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inherent uncertainties of mapping and countering systemic risk in fi-
nance. 
Against this backdrop, it is worthwhile to examine the developing 
body of thought surrounding resilience, although much more empirical 
research must be done before conclusions can be reached about its poten-
tial impact on the future course of the financial system. This Article 
seeks to illustrate how legal and regulatory measures that foster resili-
ence have become the bedfellows and ultimate backstop to macropruden-
tial regulation. It argues that, in the rush to build the institutional frame-
work for a more resilient financial system, there has been precious little 
discussion of, firstly, what the term “resilience” might mean in the con-
text of money and financial markets and, secondly, who and what exactly 
we wish to become more resilient. What are the subjects of resilience-
building measures, and might there be conflicts of interest latent in this 
agenda? Will fostering greater resilience in A potentially harm the resili-
ence of B? What are the characteristics of “the more resilient financial 
system” that is being repeatedly called for? This Article examines the 
literature emerging on adaptive and resilient responses to catastrophe and 
systemic shocks and asks what building a more resilient financial system 
might mean. It concludes by raising the possibility that some of the cur-
rent forms of “collaborative consumption” that are emerging in the Unit-
ed States and United Kingdom, as well as the growth in nonbank sources 
of lending, might actually be building a more novel form of resilience 
into the financial system, should they result in a broader shift away from 
the near monopoly enjoyed by bank-created money as objectified social 
trust. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RESILIENCE TO FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
EFFORTS CONCERNING SYSTEMIC RISK 
The development of macroprudential regulation as an extra plane of 
financial regulation is commonly justified in terms of its ability to con-
cern itself, first and foremost, with financial stability and systemic risk.3 
However, in post-crisis discussions of global financial reforms, the term 
resilience is often coupled with stability, and regulatory reforms are tar-
geted at developing a more stable and resilient financial system.4 This 
coupling of the systemic-risk and resilience-building agendas is a wise, 
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implicit recognition of the need for both the financial system as a whole 
and its individual components to be more able to withstand any future 
shock of the magnitude of the 2008 banking crisis. 
Resilience is an expressed objective of many of the proposed tools 
of macroprudential regulation. But it can also be interpreted as a back-
stop mechanism of local social defense should systemic risk manifest 
itself again in global financial systems.5 Examples of legal and regulatory 
measures motivated by this second meaning of resilience are provided by 
the U.K.’s introduction of a bespoke insolvency and resolution frame-
work for the banking sector in the Banking Act of 2009, as well as the 
strengthening of deposit protection and investor compensation schemes 
across Europe in the wake of the financial crisis.6 The proposed use of 
countercyclical capital-regulatory tools as a technique of macro-
prudential regulation is an example of the view of resilience as resistance 
to stresses and shocks. Resilience is now as central to the renewed effort 
to promote financial stability as is systemic risk. The exhortations of the 
G20 world leaders to the Financial Stability Board, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and bodies such as the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision as to the need for more resilient financial systems and 
markets from the onset of the financial crisis have treated financial sta-
bility and resilience as inextricably linked.7 Indeed, the international 
template for bank regulation, the package of measures known as “Basel 
III,” is described in its title as “A Global Regulatory Framework for 
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems.”8 In the United Kingdom, 
successive parliamentary select committee reports on the financial crisis 
and prelegislative consultations conducted by both current and previous 
governments have emphasized resilience building as key to achieving 
                                            
 5. Resilience in this context suggests an ability to bounce back or recover faster from the ef-
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89 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2011). 
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greater financial stability.9 Still, the current efforts to rebuild and reshape 
the financial system fail to engage in depth the necessary preliminary 
questions about what resilience might mean and who should be the sub-
jects of resilience-building measures. 
Turning to the current U.K. draft legislation, there is little guidance 
to be found on the meanings or characteristics of resilience. Indeed, the 
concept is only mentioned twice at the legislative level and is defined 
nowhere. Included in the core legislative mandate of the new 
macroprudential regulatory committee, the Financial Policy Committee 
(FPC), is the enhancement and protection of resilience in the financial 
system, which is reflected in the expressed goal of the FPC’s contribu-
tion to the Bank of England’s financial-stability objective: “identification 
of, monitoring of, and taking of action to remove or reduce systemic 
risks.”10 Resilience is also an expressed component of the new Financial 
Conduct Authority’s operational objective of protection and enhance-
ment of the integrity of financial markets: “integrity” is defined partly in 
terms of “soundness, stability and resilience.”11 
The lack of an adequate definition of resilience can be contrasted 
with both “financial stability” and “systemic risk,” which feature far 
more prominently in the draft legislation with characteristic indicators of 
systemic risk set out in the legislation. But nowhere is any guidance giv-
en as to the characteristics of a resilient financial system or any clarifica-
tion of whose resilience we should be most concerned with to promote a 
more resilient financial system. 
Basel III talks of the need for a more resilient banking sector and 
more resilient individual banks as intertwined with a more resilient bank-
ing system. Thus, resilience has both a macro angle and a micro angle, 
“as greater resilience at the individual bank level reduces the risk of sys-
tem-wide shocks.”12 There is, of course, far more to the financial system 
than banks and the banking sector, and the U.K. legislation avoids the 
trap of an overly specific definition, despite the fact that the term “U.K. 
financial system” is used again and again in the defined objectives of the 
                                            
 9. See HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY SELECT COMMITTEE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS, 2010-11, H.C. 430-I (U.K.); 
HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY SELECT COMMITTEE, BANKING REFORM: SEVENTEENTH REPORT, 
2007-8, H.C. 1008 (U.K.). These official government reports from both the previous Labour and the 
current coalition governments include HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: THE BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, 2011, Cm. 8083 (U.K.); HM TREASURY, REFORMING 
FINANCIAL MARKETS, 2009, Cm. 7667 (U.K.). 
 10. Bank of England Act, 1998, c. 11, § 9C(2) (U.K.), as amended by Financial Services Act, 
2012, c. 21 (U.K.). 
 11. Financial Services & Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 1D(2)(a) (U.K.), as amended by Financial 
Services Act, 2012, c. 21 (U.K.). 
 12. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 8, at 2. 
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new regulatory bodies. The U.K. financial system is defined loosely and 
nonexhaustively as (1) financial markets and exchanges, (2) regulated 
activities, and (3) other activities connected with financial markets and 
exchanges.13 
So construed, the new regulatory bodies in fact have a wide man-
date to take an expansive and imaginative view of what constitutes the 
U.K. financial system and, therefore, who or what might be the subjects 
of resilience-building measures in the future.14 I return to this point later 
to make empirical arguments that resilience-building measures are need-
ed far beyond the parameters of the official regulated financial sector, 
and that achieving a resilient financial system may in fact call for a fresh 
look at the concept of “individual financial citizenship.”15 
III. RESILIENCE IN OTHER CONTEXTS 
It is important to now look to resilience in other contexts because, 
as established in the preceding Part, there is no definition of resilience in 
the U.K. financial context. Additionally, this Part identifies key aspects 
of resilience in other contexts that may be transferable to the financial 
sector or may at least inform our analysis of what it means to be resili-
ent—and who or what should be resilient—in the financial context. The-
se key aspects of resilience include (1) the relationship between resili-
ence and vulnerability; (2) the power of resilience to enable recovery and 
its potential to release and employ imagination and creativity; (3) the 
potential for resilience-building efforts to create tension between gov-
ernment and individuals; and (4) perceived underlying motives or incen-
tives for resilience efforts that must be acknowledged. 
An examination of the meanings of resilience in other areas such as 
climate change, ecology, medicine, psychology, military efficacy, sup-
ply-chain management, and technological safety reveals that resilience 
                                            
 13. See Financial Services & Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 1D(2)(a) (U.K.), as amended by Finan-
cial Services Act, 2012, c. 21 (U.K.). 
 14. See BANK OF ENG., INSTRUMENTS OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY 8–9 (2011) (containing 
adequacy rules for systemically important U.K. financial institutions recommended by the Independ-
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tion that currently tasks the Financial Services Authority (FSA) with its consumer-protection objec-
tive, requires the FSA to have regard for “the general principle that consumers should take responsi-
bility for their decisions.” For development and exploration of the related concept of financial citi-
zenship, see JOANNA GRAY & JENNY HAMILTON, IMPLEMENTING FINANCIAL REGULATION: THEORY 
& PRACTICE ch. 6 (2006); GAIL PEARSON, FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW AND COMPLIANCE IN 
AUSTRALIA ch. 1 (2009); Joanna Gray, Corporate Governance and Personal Finance: The Missing 
Link, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 187 (2004); Toni Williams, Empowerment of Whom and for What? Finan-
cial Literacy Education and the New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services, 29 LAW & POL’Y 
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can describe a system or an individual (human or material) subject. 
Yiheyis Maru, for instance, discusses the challenges of resilience meas-
urement and distinguishes between these two levels, differentiating a 
system’s ability to absorb disturbances and retain functionality from an 
individual’s “ability or competence to function well, despite adverse life 
circumstances.”16 
A. Resilience and Vulnerability 
Discussions of resilience often go hand in hand with discussions of 
vulnerability,17 and resilient systems and people are seen to be those that 
exhibit flexibility and adaptivity. In an interesting discussion of the 
qualities of a resilient social system sited in the context of the many fail-
ures in response to Hurricane Katrina, Benigno Aguirre challenges the 
view of resilience and vulnerability as binary opposites.18 Instead, he ar-
gues that the two are inextricably linked. According to him, they are, in 
fact, both agents of change to the development of adaptive capacity in 
any open social system. Aguirre argues that it is wrong to assume that 
indicators of vulnerability such as poverty or infirmity are directly corre-
lated to a lack of resilience in a community with those characteristics. He 
links vulnerability to knowability of risk, arguing that vulnerabilities can 
often be latent signals of unknown risk.19 
B. Imagination and Creativity 
A more subtle understanding of what makes for a resilient social 
system or community is needed than seeing resilience simply as collec-
tive preparedness—the ability to rebound, recover functionality, and car-
ry on much as before. The capacity to adapt and change, along with the 
capacity to imagine wholly new combinations of scenarios or events, is a 
key feature of a resilient system. Thus, Maru describes resilience as 
partly a recursive function of conscious awareness, planning, and 
training that anticipates or responds to the presence of vulnerabili-
ties and tries to mitigate and provide solutions to them. These are all 
dimensions of resilient systems. Resilient actions do not merely re-
flect the capacity of systems to reconstitute themselves as they ex-
isted prior to the crisis, but show a system’s ability to absorb, re-
spond, recover, and reorganize from an internally or externally in-
                                            
 16. Yiheyis T. Maru, Resilient Regions: Clarity of Concepts and Challenges to Systemic Meas-
urement 1 (Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org., Working Paper No. 4, 2010) (Austl.). 
 17. See generally B.E. Aguirre, Dialectics of Vulnerability and Resilience, 14 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 39 (2007). 
 18. Id. at 39. 
 19. Id. at 42. 
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duced set of demands which reveal the presence of vulnerability and 
bring about mitigation efforts. . . . [I]t is a never-ending open pro-
cess, for multiple sources of often unanticipated demands create 
changes in the known dynamics of the systems. Past experiences 
cannot be used as the only source of information to anticipate new 
risks. Imagination, creativity, and careful historical reconstructions 
of past disastrous events, including both cross national and interna-
tional scientific assessments of major crises and disasters, are need-
ed to attempt to anticipate and prevent new risks’ effects.20 
The development of resilience in communities and individuals has 
become a matter of practical policy concern and interest at the European 
Union and at a national level in the United Kingdom. Recent research 
funded by the E.U. Citizens and Resilience Project, using the very differ-
ent examples of a community response to a terrorist attack and the im-
pact of music education on children, traces the development of the con-
cept of resilience from its original perception as a given individual per-
sonality trait to its more recent conception as the recovery process of an 
organization, community, or individual.21 The unit of the U.K. govern-
ment responsible for emergency preparedness and disaster management, 
for instance, seeks to coordinate local governments, emergency and med-
ical services, private businesses, infrastructure providers, contractors, 
regulators, and ordinary individuals to harness its efforts on a continuing 
basis in resilience-building measures and awareness-raising initiatives.22 
C. Government–Individual Tension 
Much of the resilience literature raises profound questions about the 
relationship among the official government sector, individuals, and local 
communities and, therefore, about the responsibility to avoid and re-
spond to crises. Many commentators emphasize that fostering resilience 
requires a reorientation of belief about responsibility. They have argued 
that resilient systems take a grassroots, bottom-up, adaptive approach, 
often using a variety of networks of private and civil-society actors that 
interact successfully.23 Thus, in the context of the mitigation and adapta-
tion debate over climate policy, Peter Hayes argues that resilience should 
be seen as adaptive, emergent behavior driven by cities and local com-
                                            
 20. Id. at 43. 
 21. Hans te Brake et al., Resilience from Concept to Practice, in TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
VEILIGHEID 2 (2008) (published as part of the E.U. Citizens & Resilience Project). 
 22. UK Resilience, CABINET OFFICE, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2012). 
 23. Aguirre, supra note 17, at 58. 
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munities rather than markets or nation-states.24 On the other hand, by 
using the example of telecommunications network systems and regula-
tors’ attempts to respond to crises to preserve their functionality (with 
illustrations of her argument sited in the failures of electricity supply and 
the subprime mortgage crisis, too), Barbara Cherry has questioned 
whether regulatory resilience is consistent with the sustainability of the 
rule of law.25 She argues that the nonlinearity and the urgent nature of 
responses to crises, framed in terms of resilience, are caused by a func-
tion of both deregulatory policy and rapid social and technological 
change.26 And she concludes that this response is antithetical to tradition-
al notions of the rule of law. So resilience building may challenge estab-
lished norms of institutional governance. Despite its focus on the tele-
communications sector, Cherry’s critique of regulatory attempts to foster 
resilience demonstrates the considerable challenges that macroprudential 
regulation will present to lawyers. Globalized finance has accelerated 
over time and space to present hazards and risks of systemic failure that 
demand the same kind of nonlinearity and the same element of surprise 
in regulatory response that they themselves manifest. 
D. Motivations 
Apart from the implications for the rule of law and democratic gov-
ernance raised by the rapid response techniques that a resilience-building 
agenda may call for, questions regarding the motives of those calling for 
greater resilience may still arise. Pat O’Malley has offered a powerful 
critique of these policy agendas. Specifically, O’Malley uses the exam-
ples of the U.S. response to 9/11 and the U.S. military-resiliency pro-
grams focusing on networked warfare to sound a note of caution about 
whose interests are being served by the proliferation of resilience-
building measures as the latest and most voguish response to the peren-
nial problem of uncertainty.27 O’Malley argues that resilience follows 
from other responses to the problems of governing under conditions of 
risk and radical uncertainty—namely, precaution, speculative preemp-
tion, and the enactment and preparedness characteristic of a post-9/11 
                                            
 24. See generally Peter Hayes, Resilience as Emergent Behaviour, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175 (2009). 
 25. See generally Barbara A. Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Under 
Complexity: Providing Resilience Within the Rule of Law, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2008). 
 26. Cherry terms the process “social acceleration of time.” Id. at 3–4 (citing WILLIAM E. 
SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME, at xv (2004)). 
 27. Pat O’Malley, From Risks to Resilience: Technologies of the Self in the Age of Catastro-
phes (May 11, 2012) (unpublished conference paper for the University of Chicago seminar “The 
Future of Risk”), http://ccct.uchicago.edu/media/files/the-future-of-risk/O'Malley_Resilience.pdf. 
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world attempting to more acutely incorporate risk techniques.28 Accord-
ing to O’Malley, developing resilient individuals and communities that 
can encounter, and thrive in the face of, chaos and socioeconomic inse-
curity is an extension in many ways of the neoliberal view of individuals 
as entrepreneurial nomads.29 He acknowledges, 
[I]t could be argued instilling people with techniques for optimism, 
resourcefulness, enterprise and social networking is no [b]ad thing. 
Nor is it more objectionable than any of the other programs in the 
past that have tried to make better subjects of us. And at least this 
does not project a narrow band of repressive moral impera-
tives . . . .30 
But he points to the fact that some have seen a dark side to resilience 
programs as being an attempt to harness cognitive and emotional capaci-
ties of peoples to defensive ends.31 Given the reach of resilience building 
far beyond military contexts, O’Malley is content to conclude merely on 
a note of caution rather than an outright critique of resilience tech-
niques—pointing out that there is still much unknown about their per-
formance and effects. 
Some might retort that O’Malley sees resilience through a narrow 
lens—as a program of action led from the top down by the public and 
state authorities when, in fact, it can also be seen as efforts initiated from 
the bottom up. Indeed, while some of the recent developments in finan-
cial intermediation, trading, and payment mechanisms may at first sight 
appear unconnected and dissimilar, these mechanisms may all serve as 
evidence of this alternative view of resilience suggested by O’Malley. 
Initiatives as different from each other as, for example, peer-to-peer lend-
ing of business finance and collaborative consumption of leisure goods 
both actually arise from a desire on the part of their various participants 
for a greater degree of trust and resilience that is led from outside of the 
bank-dominated and officially regulated financial system. These initia-
tives are considered further in the next Part of this Article. 
IV. CAN THINKING ABOUT WHAT GIVES RISE TO RESILIENCE HELP US 
RETHINK FINANCIAL MARKETS? 
U.K. financial regulators are now charged with securing a stable 
and resilient financial system that is less likely to encounter the break-
down of trust and functionality that has characterized the world’s finan-
                                            
 28. Id. at 4. 
 29. Id. at 21. 
 30. Id. at 22. 
 31. Id. (citing MICHAEL DILLON & JULIAN REID, THE LIBERAL WAY OF WAR: KILLING TO 
MAKE LIFE LIVE 138–40 (2009)). 
808 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:799 
cial markets and has spilled over into the economy at large, as trust and 
confidence in financial institutions, markets, financial assets, and curren-
cies remain low. Any system has its component parts, and the financial 
system ultimately consists of individuals exercising those aspects of their 
citizenship that involve them at the various chains and channels of finan-
cial intermediation (be they of business or personal finance) constituting 
the financial system. The ambit of financial regulation has sought to pro-
tect and promote the exercise of this citizenship, as well as map it onto 
the domain in which it takes place—the financial system. But there are 
signs that the nature of this domain may be becoming more diverse and 
less familiar as the very individuals that regulation seeks to protect begin 
to experiment with modes of financial intermediation that lie outside of 
what we have recently come to imagine as the financial system. If the 
universe of the financial system is expanding and fragmenting, this has 
implications for the mission of regulators to embed stability and resili-
ence. These are the issues to which this Article now turns. 
Along with home ownership, the predominant way households in 
Anglo-Saxon economies have sought to store and exchange value is 
through money and financial assets that flow through the banking sec-
tor.32 This has inevitably led to banks and the banking system becoming 
central to the lives of everyone in these economies, save the most mar-
ginal and excluded members of society. Since the retreat from collective 
provision via local mutualism or state-funded welfare, individuals in the-
se economies have been exhorted to become responsible “financial citi-
zens”33 by building up a lifetime store of wealth, often through the medi-
um of tax-privileged financial products developed by the regulated fi-
nancial sector acting in tandem with government. Borrowing and debt 
have been depicted to both households and governments as techniques of 
financial management that can lead to a better and more fulfilled future.34 
Techniques of financial innovation such as securitization provided reas-
surance that the default risks were less rather than more of a problem.35 
                                            
 32. ISABELLE YNESTA, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HOUSEHOLDS’ WEALTH 
COMPOSITION ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES AND FINANCIAL RISKS BORNE BY HOUSEHOLDS (2008), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/finance/financialmarkets/42143434.pdf. 
 33. CRAIG BERRY & VALENTINA SERRA, INT’L LONGEVITY CTR., FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP: 
RETHINKING THE STATE’S ROLE IN ENABLING INDIVIDUALS TO SAVE 17–20 (2012), available at 
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/index.php/ publications/publication_details/financial_citizenship. 
 34. Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. 
ECON. LIT. 688, 688–726 (1997). 
 35. For example, the International Monetary Fund published a report in 2006 on U.K. financial 
stability, noting approvingly the risk-reduction capacity of the market in collateralized derivative 
securities. INT’L MONETARY FUND, UNITED KINGDON: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2005 ARTICLE IV 
CONSULTATION 21–22 (IMF County Report No. 06/87, Mar. 2006), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr0686.pdf. 
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Together, various financial-citizenship initiatives and the very existence 
of a protective layer of regulatory oversight encouraged households and 
individuals to engage the regulated financial sector on a widespread basis 
in order to meet financing and savings needs.36 
Bank runs and bank failures also have implications beyond the re-
silience of the financial sector. The financial citizen, with her trust shak-
en by the latent fragility of the financial system, may seek to render her-
self and her community more resilient to these future shocks by decou-
pling from the financial system and searching for means of objectifying 
value in ways that appear, at least to her, more resilient and impervious 
to the uncertainties of the future. This has implications for both the fi-
nancial sector and the government, as post-crisis public disaffection with 
a large swathe of the regulated financial sector may turn people away 
from the use of banks to fulfill savings, investments, and payment needs. 
Indeed, trends are emerging in the United Kingdom showing the paying 
down of household debt,37 a drop in retail savings and investment 
through instruments linked to markets,38 and a renewal of interest in and 
use of mutual financial institutions, especially building societies39 and 
credit unions.40 There is growing official realization that greater use of 
nonbank sources of financing, such as online receivables exchanges and 
peer-to-peer lending platforms, may help combat the shortfall in business 
                                            
 36. JAMES BANKS & SARAH TANNER, INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, HOUSEHOLD SAVING IN THE 
U.K. 104 (1999), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/hhs.pdf. 
 37. Statistics from the British Bankers Association (BBA) on high-street banking in the United 
Kingdom showed that in May 2012 net repayment of mortgage debt exceeded net new lending, 
continuing an eight-month trend of increasing levels of debt repayment. British Banker’s Ass’n, May 
2012 Figures for the Main High Street Banks (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.bba.org.uk/ 
media/article/may-2012-figures-for-the-main-high-street-banks. 
 38. A July 27, 2012, press release from the U.K. Investment Management Association shows a 
marked year-on-year drop in funds under management, net retail sales, and net individual savings 
account (ISA) sales in the United Kingdom. An ISA is a form of tax-privileged wrapper for securi-
ties-markets investments available to every individual in the UK. Press Release, Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n, 
First Half of 2012 Sees Strong Investment Fund Sales - IMA Statistics Reveal (July 27, 2012), 
available at http://centrallobby.politicshome.com/members/member-press/member-press-details/ 
newsarticle/first-half-of-2012-sees-strong-investment-fund-sales-ima-statistics-reveal///sites/investm 
ent-management-association/. 
 39. Press Release, Bldg. Soc’ys Ass’n, Lending by Mutuals Grows Strongly in the First Half of 
2012 (June 30, 2012), available at http://www.bsa.org.uk/mediacentre/press/monthlystats_ 
june12.pdf. 
 40. ASS’N OF BRITISH CREDIT UNIONS LTD., “TO CUT A LONG STORY SHORT…”: ABCUL 
ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2011), available at http://www.abcul.org/filegrab/documents/807c187bdd 
39bfb4f280ecbcb8a9c35a/6405-abcul-annual-report-final.pdf (extracting FSA data showing marked 
growth in assets, membership, and lending by U.K. credit unions). 
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financing currently affecting the small- and medium-sized business sec-
tor in particular.41 
Recent growth in peer-to-peer lending schemes, such as ZOPA in 
the United Kingdom42 and Prosper.com in the United States, appears to 
signal that the landscape of financial intermediation is indeed being re-
shaped quite radically.43 Experimental research into U.S. peer-to-peer 
lending reveals that the perceived trustworthiness of listed borrowers 
increased the likelihood of obtaining a loan above all other factors—an 
interesting finding, given the assumption that a legal system with well-
developed contract-enforcement mechanisms would function as an insti-
tutionalized substitute for trust.44 Roman Tomasic and Folarin Akinbami 
have used well-publicized breakdowns in trust in the wholesale financial 
markets to argue that trust is as key to the resilience of these markets as it 
is to retail finance.45 Their argument that there is more to resilience than 
efficient enforcement of contracts echoes the growing clamor in econom-
ics literature for a deeper understanding of the driving forces of financial 
systems than those offered by classical economics.46 
Peer-to-peer lending and payment systems not based on banks have 
been used to call for the early adoption of common data standards within 
finance in order to foster the development of these types of new entrants 
to the financial system. For example, Robleh Ali and colleagues have 
argued that “[w]ith open access to borrower information, held centrally 
and virtually, there is no reason why end-savers and end-investors cannot 
connect directly. The banking middle men may in time become the sur-
plus links in the chain.”47 
                                            
 41. DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, BOOSTING FINANCE OPTIONS FOR BUSINESS 31 
(2012), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/enterprise/docs/b/12-668-boosting-
finance-options-for-business.pdf. 
 42. Peer-to-peer lending sites currently operating in the United Kingdom—ZOPA, Ratesetter, 
Crowdcube, and Funding Circle—have now lent over £250 million since they began operating in 
2005. Simon Gompertz, Peer-to-Peer Lending via the Internet Hits £250m, BBC NEWS (June 8, 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18370777; see also ANDY DAVIS, CTR. FOR STUDY OF 
FIN. INNOVATION, SEEDS OF CHANGE: EMERGING SOURCES OF NON-BANK FUNDING FOR BRITAIN’S 
SMES (2012). 
 43. See DAVIS, supra note 42, at 3–4. 
 44. Jefferson Duarte et al., Trust and Credit 30–32 (June 2, 2010) (Am. Fin. Ass’n 2010 Atlan-
ta Meetings Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1343275. 
 45. Roman Tomasic & Folarin Akinbami, The Role of Trust in Maintaining the Resilience of 
Financial Markets, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 369 (2011). 
 46. Helge Peukert, Dysfunctional Aspects of Contemporary Financial Markets: Diagnosis and 
Prescription 33 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 321 (2012). 
 47. Robleh D. Ali et al., Towards a Common Financial Language, Presentation at Securities 
Industry & Financial Markets Association Symposium: Building a Global Legal Entity Identifier 
Framework 18 (Mar. 14 , 2012). 
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Although some see newer sources of financing that sideline banks 
as a welcome trend toward a more democratic form of finance,48 there is 
still little empirical evidence relating users’ motives, perceptions, and 
understanding of these nonbank sources of funding to the extent and en-
forceability of their substantive legal and regulatory rights. Regulators 
have identified the potential risks of some of these new lending platforms 
and have called for regulatory uncertainty surrounding peer-to-peer lend-
ing to be addressed, along with greater consumer information and the use 
of risk warnings by crowd-funding platforms.49 
V. RESILIENCE, BANKS, AND MONEY 
This Article now shifts from exploring the meanings of resilience 
that ought to underlie building a more resilient financial system, to iden-
tifying who and what should be wrought more resilient and how this 
might be best achieved. Because we have hitherto considered the resili-
ence of the financial system as inextricably bound to the fate of banks 
and “sound and safe” money, this Part briefly analyses the vast and too-
often-neglected topic of the nature of money, including the key constitu-
tive role of private bank debt. It concludes by asking whether a plural 
vision of money would enable increased resilience. The decline of trust 
in and between banks that has characterized the financial crisis calls for 
closer engagement with the nature of money itself and, in particular, the 
relationship between banks and money that has developed over time. The 
essence of a bank run is, after all, loss of trust in the whole idea of money 
being safe and secure in the bank—an idea that, in an age of fractional 
reserve banking, was always somewhat of a fiction, however powerful.50 
From the standpoint of a resilience-building agenda, it is significant if 
individuals begin to seek alternatives to banks as stores of value and fiat 
monies as means of payment without recourse to bank debt (specifically, 
deposits as a means of fulfilling these functions). Bypassing banks as 
conduits of money could avoid the negative externalities of future bank-
ing crises because our store of objectified social trust would no longer 
repose within the banking sector as it does today. But the relationship 
between banks and money requires closer analysis before speculating on 
whether a more pluralistic landscape of objectified value is a realistic 
                                            
 48. Merryn Somerset Webb, How People Power Is Changing Banks, FIN. TIMES (June 22, 
2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/da198458-bbcc-11e1-9436-00144feabdc0.html#axzz27AQ0DyTz. 
 49. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., COORDINATION COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT 2011/2012 (2012), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/cc-annual-report-2012.pdf. 
 50. JOSH RYAN-COLLINS ET AL., WHERE DOES MONEY COME FROM?: A GUIDE TO THE UK 
MONETARY AND BANKING SYSTEM 11 (2011). 
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possibility. This, in turn, calls for a brief consideration of the nature of 
money itself from the viewpoint of a number of disciplines. 
Despite mainstream economists’ obvious continuing concern with 
measures and effects of the money supply on the economy, they have 
paid scant attention to the characteristics of money itself. As Josh Ryan-
Collins and colleagues have pointed out, “[m]any people would be sur-
prised to learn that even among bankers, economists, and policymakers, 
there is no common understanding of how new money is created.”51 
Through the lens of a commercial transactional lawyer, Roy Goode eval-
uated the question, What is money? Goode concluded that the question 
only assumes practical significance because of the need within com-
merce and trade for a universal system of payment.52 David Bholat ar-
rived at a similar conclusion after sketching out the changing view of 
money in the history of economic thought.53 
In their neglect of the dominant role that private bank debt plays in 
money in the United Kingdom, many economists have ignored its poten-
tial to expose the real economy to the fragility and shock similar to that 
which results from the maturity mismatch inherent in a banking model 
based on sight deposits.54 For this reason, it is possible to take issue with 
the current orthodoxy that increasing levels of bank credit and lending by 
the financial sector are necessarily the best ways to foster recovery and 
economic development. So long as our notions of recovery, economic 
development, and national well-being are measured in terms of money, 
without sufficient analysis of what money itself is and why and how cer-
tain types of debt assumed such a near monopoly as shorthand for objec-
tifying value, the way forward to a more resilient financial and economic 
system will remain blocked. 
For if we are asking what money is, it is helpful to turn to its his-
torical roots. Christine Desan has traced the history of modern money to 
the formation of the Bank of England in 1694, and she highlighted how 
money was very much a creature of the state, which was faced with limi-
tations on its ability to borrow against future revenues in the system of 
coinage then in widespread use.55 The solution came in the form of as-
                                            
 51. Id. at 3. 
 52. ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW (1995) (cited in agreement by CHARLES PROCTOR, The 
Concept of Money, in MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY (6th ed. 2005)). 
 53. “Money may be defined as a special form of credit which conventionally acts as a means of 
final payment.” David Bholat, Money, Bank Debt, and Business Cycles: Between Economic Devel-
opment and Financial Crises, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Orkun 
Akseli ed., forthcoming 2013). 
 54. See id. 
 55. CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CREDIT AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM IN 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN WORLD 9–10 (forthcoming). 
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signable interest-bearing bills and, subsequently, bank notes from the 
Bank of England, itself a consortium of private investors.56 The Bank’s 
promises to pay the government were used to pay its own obligations 
and, crucially for their public legitimacy, were accepted as payment of 
tax debts at the face value of the notes: 
By the end of the seventeenth century, the government and the 
Bank, in concert with individuals, had groped their way to a re-
markable arrangement. They had inaugurated a paper currency that 
was tied to specie as the unit of account. . . . It passed hand to hand 
and held purchasing power. Each side of the triangle benefited from 
the arrangement. The remaining question is—how much?57 
Desan takes issue with many conventional accounts of the sponta-
neous development of money in response to the market’s invisible hand: 
[T]he fingerprints of public authority, along with those of its private 
allies and the larger community, were all over the new medium. It 
had its impetus in an effort by the government to borrow in a form 
that multiplied liquidity, creating monetarized promises to pay and 
enmeshing public officials and private lenders in a web of recipro-
cal relationships.58 
This perspective on how state and private banking interests originally 
constituted money resonates today, as we see these two sets of actors still 
locked together to kick-start the supply of money through an increase in 
bank credit and lending once more.59 
Whatever its origins, a shortage of money as we now know it and 
constitute it in law and practice in the economy has clearly led to a low-
ering of economic activity, confidence, and living standards. If the goal 
is to foster greater resilience in the face of such a decline in the banking 
system, perhaps we should shift focus away from restoring bank lending 
and toward rethinking the role of money in society. 
                                            
 56. Id. at 18–19. The bank’s capital was not fully called up. In effect, the government was 
using private promises to pay off the wealthy as collateral to secure the acceptability of the notes it 
used to pay other members of society. 
 57. Id. at 40–41. 
 58. Id. at 51. 
 59. An agreement between the U.K. government and major U.K. banks known as “Project 
Merlin” involves regular dialogue between banks and the government with a view to boosting bank 
lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises especially. For an overview of this agreement, see 
Press Release, HM Treasury, Government Welcomes Banks’ Statements on Lending 15% More to 
SMEs, and on Pay and Support for Regional Growth (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_17_11.htm. The Bank of England tracks the progress of banks’ implementa-
tion of this agreement through its data on trends in lending. Additional Data for Lending to UK 
Businesses, Including “Project Merlin” Data, BANK OF ENG., http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
publications/Pages/other/monetary/additionaldata.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
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Here we can learn much from the vast anthropological literature on 
barter and the emergence of money, credit, and debt in different socie-
ties. For instance, David Graeber’s recent work has emphasized that 
money and debt did not develop from barter, as is often supposed, but 
instead had a very different role in early English society of building rela-
tionships within communities, with barter being a one-off and instanta-
neous exchange generally used for dealing with strangers.60 Caroline 
Humphrey has argued that barter’s lack of a temporal dimension demon-
strates that it can be seen as a means of exchange but not a means of 
payment. Thus, she concluded that the use of barter in post-monetary 
economies tends to coincide with money ceasing to function as a stand-
ard of value and that barter economies become less integrated and more 
atomized.61 Reports from Greece of increasing use of barter to obtain 
goods and services bear testament to her thesis.62 
Keith Hart, one of the foremost theorists of money, reviewed its or-
igins in an essay and asked whether the current crisis of money is signal-
ing the demise of national capitalism. He highlighted Polanyi’s insight in 
The Great Transformation: 
[O]nly modern money combines the four functions (payment, 
standard, store and exchange) in a few “all-purpose” symbols, na-
tional currency. . . . Polanyi argued against the primacy of money as 
a medium of exchange and for a multi-stranded model of its evolu-
tion. For him and for Keynes, it was above all a means of payment 
or the “purchasing power” of citizens which drives modern econo-
mies, not so much a medium of exchange for buying or selling as 
such.63 
A more plural vision of money than we currently have might serve to 
increase resilience to future banking shocks and crises insofar as it has 
the potential to liberate citizens and hence the economy from the effects 
of the contraction of bank credit. 
Outside of the regulated banking and financial sector, too, emerges 
a sign that individuals, communities, and local economies are beginning 
to bypass traditional bank credit as a means of payment. Interest in alter-
                                            
 60. See generally DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS (2011). 
 61. Caroline Humphrey, Barter and Economic Disintegration, 20 MAN 49, 64 (1985). For an 
extensive review of the anthropological work on money and debt, see Gustav Peebles, The Anthro-
pology of Credit and Debt, 39 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 225, 225–40 (2010). 
 62. Rachel Donadio, Battered by Economic Crisis, Greeks Turn to Barter Networks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/europe/in-greece-barter-networks-
surge.html?pagewanted=all. 
 63. Keith Hart, A Crisis of Money: The Demise of National Capitalism, OPENDEMOCRACY 
(Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/keith-hart/crisis-of-
money-demise-of-national-capitalism. 
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native nonmonetary payment and exchange systems has increased since 
the financial crisis. For example, the networks fostered by LETSLink UK 
(UK Local Exchange Trading and Complementary Currencies Develop-
ment Agency) aim to promote “local community-based mutual aid net-
works in which people exchange all kinds of goods and services with one 
another, without the need for money.”64 Similarly, the Transition Town 
network fosters various forms of bartering and nonmonetary and mone-
tary exchange65 at a local level and claims to be a network of “communi-
ty-led responses to climate change and shrinking supplies of cheap ener-
gy, building resilience and happiness.”66 
Humphrey’s analysis of nonmoney payment systems suggests that 
their use is associated with localization of economies.67 While many of 
the developments described above do have roots in local geographic 
places, as Hart has pointed out, modern technology enables virtual and 
borderless exchanges to take place in a way that may contain profound 
challenges for accepted forms of political association and that increase 
the potential for what he terms “economic democracy”: 
[W]e should look for the meaning of money in the myriad acts of 
remembering which link individuals to their communities. In this 
interpretation, the need to keep track of proliferating connections 
with others is mediated by money in its many forms as the principal 
instrument of collective memory.68  
To an increasing extent, it will be possible for people to enter cir-
cuits of exchange based on voluntary association and defined by 
special currencies of the sort pioneered in LETS systems. At the 
other extreme, we will be able to participate as individuals in global 
markets of infinite scope, using international moneys-of-account, 
such as the dollar, electronic payment systems of various sorts or 
even direct barter via the internet.69 
The growth in use of sites such as Swap.com and Landshare, mem-
orably termed “collaborative consumption,”70 is made possible in part 
                                            
 64. LETSLINK UK, www.letslinkuk.net/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). For a case study of one 
scheme, see generally Ethel Crowley, Local Exchange Trading Systems: Globalising Rural Commu-
nities (Inst. for Int’l Integration Studies, Trinity Coll. Dublin, Discussion Paper No. 37, 2004). 
 65. A local currency scheme operates in one Devon town in southwest rural England. 
 66. TRANSITION NETWORK, http://www.transitionnetwork.org (last visited Sept. 21. 2012). 
 67. Humphrey, supra note 61, at 64. 
 68. See KEITH HART, THE MEMORY BANK (2000). 
 69. Keith Hart, Money in an Unequal World, MEMORY BANK, http://thememorybank.co.uk/ 
papers/money-in-an-unequal-world/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 70. See generally RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF 
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010); see also The Movement, COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION 
HUB, http://www.collaborativeconsumption.com/the-movement (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (de-
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due to the use of digital technology to shorten the chain of intermediation 
involved in consumption and exchange. This trend seems to support 
Hart’s prediction that barter need not be determined by geography and 
seems to offer the types of special-purpose currencies as an alternative to 
general-purpose money. This trend also has the potential to threaten the 
centrality of money in peoples’ lives as a means of constituting identity 
and connection. 
The bottom-up message of proactive civic preparedness underlying 
these initiatives would seem to support the analyses of resilient systems 
from writers such as Aguirre and Hayes discussed above. But there is a 
need to better understand the performance of these systems under condi-
tions of stress, including how they interact within established legal 
frameworks of enforcement and whether they are in fact developing en-
forcement infrastructure and institutions of their own. Even Hart, in his 
enthusiasm for these new modes of exchange, acknowledges that the 
problems of “timing, trust and delivery will not disappear overnight,”71 
and as ever, it will fall to the official legal system to resolve these prob-
lems when they occur. The questions of what payment obligations the 
law will recognize, and whether and how courts will deploy traditional 
contractual remedies in support of these alternative value systems, is also 
of concern.72 New ways of expressing and exchanging value may chal-
lenge private lawyers as well as regulators, although the English com-
mon law doctrine of consideration would itself seem to be resilient 
enough to be equal to the task.73 Indeed, the reference text for the U.K. 
courts on points concerning F. A. Mann’s classic work, The Legal Aspect 
of Money, acknowledges this as it contrasts state theory of money, under-
lying monetary sovereignty, with what it terms “societary” theory and 
concludes that 
[w]hether a particular asset or instrument constitutes “money” in the 
sense that it can be used as a means of payment must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis and may in part depend upon changes in 
banking practice and technological developments; the nature of the 
instruments which fall within this definition may thus change from 
time to time.74 
                                            
 71. Hart, supra note 69. 
 72. For example, in the event of default, no remedy of specific performance of a contract will 
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Although this definition appears to still site money within banks 
and their practices, it is used to support the now-universal view that bank 
deposits are money despite being obligations owed by private institu-
tions. Mann goes on to admit the possibility that “[n]ew forms of money 
may emerge as a means of payment as they gain a sufficient level of ac-
ceptance within the business world or the community generally.”75 So 
courts may, and do, recognize and enforce obligations assumed and 
transactions entered into with consideration even though the considera-
tion makes no reference to money as understood by the state and banks 
but instead reflects individuals’ own ways of conceiving and quantifying 
value without recourse to those two agencies. When the early common 
law courts articulated the doctrine of permissible contractual considera-
tion, they took the view that “[m]oney’s [w]orth” could be expressed in 
whatever had value in the eyes of the parties concerned, and they did not 
inquire closely into the adequacy of consideration or its equivalent worth 
in money.76 Indeed, they are the taxing authorities that have most often 
litigated the question of the legal nature of barter77 and the availability of 
various tax reliefs.78 For barter transactions taking place in the United 
Kingdom, the determination of the amount of “taxable supply,” the tax 
lawyer’s term for price in this context, for the purposes of levying indi-
rect taxation—known as VAT in the United Kingdom—is expressed as 
follows: 
[T]he open market value of a supply of goods or services shall be 
taken to be the amount that would fall to be taken as its value . . . if 
the supply were for such consideration in money as would be paya-
ble by a person standing in no such relationship with any person as 
would affect that consideration.79 
The ability of tax law to impede the development of new forms of 
payment and exchange systems operating without money has led some to 
propose an exemption from all tax laws for community-based schemes 
on the grounds that the revenue loss would be minimal and far out-
weighed by the encouragement of community-building and noneconomic 
goals.80 But the U.K. tax authorities have shown persistent vigor in pro-
tecting the tax base through their pursuit via courts of a huge range of 
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 76. Thomas v. Thomas, [1842] 2 Q.B. 851 (Eng.). 
 77. For a review of the extensive case law in which principles for tax treatment of barter trans-
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trading arrangements that make use of nonmoney consideration in ar-
rangements for the supply of goods or services.81 The continuing refine-
ment of tax legislation shows the relevance of Desan’s question when 
she links the development of money to the coalescence of the interests of 
late seventeenth-century government and the Bank of England acting in 
concert with individuals: “Each side of the triangle benefited from the 
arrangement. The remaining question is-how much?”82 It is interesting 
that Desan also links the emergence of money to “the development of a 
politics that was fought over appropriations and levies.” She explains 
that “the Government assumed the status of an individual, a party that 
consistently borrowed at interest to finance its expenses rather than using 
its distinctive capacity as a collective to anticipate taxes and dispense 
transferability in return.”83 
The government has an interest in ensuring a continuing role for 
money in nonmonetary systems because money confers on these systems 
the language and tools necessary to extract the government’s share of 
any alternative forms of objectified social trust that peoples and commu-
nities may develop. Thus, O’Malley’s suspicion that resilience building 
is a façade may contain a kernel of truth. And yet, one way to increase 
resilience from future banking and financial crises may be for local 
communities to seek more plural and manageable means of expressing 
and building trust and identity. Indeed, as Hart has argued, these efforts 
might herald new forms of democratic association even though such 
forms may not necessarily serve the interests of the nation-state. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the developments considered in this Article are different 
from each other and have been used by different sets of actors at differ-
                                            
 81. E.g., Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd. v. Humphrey [1946] 2 All E.R. 742, 747. In Gold 
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 82. DESAN, supra note 55, at 41. 
 83. Id. at 51–52. 
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ent times to fulfill different needs, they may offer genuine alternatives to 
the modes of intermediation that have dominated financial markets. The-
se bottom-up developments have clear implications for the questions of 
resilience, systemic risk, and vulnerability of individuals and households 
to future shocks and crises. An interesting future research agenda would 
seek to explore peoples’ motives for using these forms of value creation 
and exchange, asking to what extent their use was a result of their desire 
to decouple from the established regulated financial sector or simply a 
quest for a better return on money than can currently be earned on bank 
deposits and government bonds. This question must be answered before 
an assessment can be made of the likelihood that resilience will increase 
as a result of these new exchange and payment systems. 
Much more empirical research, therefore, is needed on these poten-
tially rehumanizing, alternative financial systems. On the one hand, if 
they do reduce the degree of interconnectedness and risk of contagion 
throughout the financial system, they may have the potential to help cre-
ate the systemic-risk-reducing “diversity” in the financial system that 
Andrew Haldane and Robert May have argued for.84 One way to achieve 
this diversity is to open up a more plural value system of money so that 
problems in the banking sector are not so destructive of collective value 
and trust in the future. On the other hand, the schemes that appear to of-
fer this potential may come with their own sets of risks and uncertainties 
that cause future hardship and loss similar to that of the banking crisis. In 
seeking to foster stability and resilience within the financial system, reg-
ulators must interpret their mandate as broadly as possible and examine 
these new forms of value creation and means of exchange, alongside the 
part of the financial system that traditionally falls within the regulatory 
perimeter. 
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